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Abstract: Recently, a new body of scholarship on “settler colonialism” has emerged with the 
goal of analyzing the non-Native dimension of Indigenous-settler relations, in Canada and other 
settler states. This paper will identify two shortcomings of the new literature: first, a tendency to 
conflate mass-level non-Natives with the state itself; and second, an erroneous, primordial 
presentation of non-Native norms and identity. This paper examines two case studies of settler 
political mobilization in opposition to Indigenous peoples in the contexts of the Indigenous 
occupations at Ipperwash/Aazhoodena in the early- to mid-1990s, and Caledonia/Kanonhstaton 
in 2006. The cases reveal consistency in how the mobilization is framed by non-Native 
participants – as a defense of abstract procedural principles like equality before the law and 
public order. This normative framework does not resonate with settler colonial theory. They also 
illustrate the degree to which mass-level non-Natives are autonomous actors in the relationship. 
During both conflicts, local non-Natives often advanced divergent interests from those of the 
state, producing a tripartite political dynamic that is not anticipated in the literature.  
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Résumé: Récemment, un nouvel ensemble de connaissances a émergé sur "settler colonialism," 
dans le but d'analyser la dimension non-Autochtone de la relation Autochtones / non-
Autochtones, au Canada et dans d'autres pays d'immigration. Cet article identifie deux difficultés 
de ce nouveau courant de pensée: d'abord, une tendance à confondre la masse des non-
Autochtones avec l'État lui-même; en deuxième lieu, une représentation erronée des normes et de 
l'identité des non-Autochtones. Cet article procède à deux études de cas de mobilisation politique 
des non-Autochtones en opposition à des peuples autochtones, dans le contexte des occupations 
autochtones à Ipperwash/Aazhoodena du début au milieu des années 1990, et à 
Caledonia/Kanonhstaton en 2006. Ces cas révèlent une cohérence des mobilisations conçues par 
les participants  non-Autochtones comme une défense de principes procéduriers abstraits comme 
l'égalité devant la Loi et l'ordre public. Cette structure normative n'est pas en harmonie avec la 
théorie coloniale habituelle. Ces cas illustrent aussi le degré auquel la masse de la population 
non-autochtone est un acteur autonome de la relation. Lors de ces deux conflits, les non-
Autochtones locaux ont souvent montré des intérêts divergents de ceux de l'État, induisant ainsi 
une dynamique politique tripartite que la réflexion n'avait pas prévue. 
Mots-clés: peuples autochtones, colonialisme des non-autochtone
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Introduction 
 
The iconic image of the 1990 “Oka 
Crisis” - when Mohawks established road 
barricades to prevent development on 
disputed land, sparking a conflict with the 
Canadian army - features a private of the 
Royal 22e Regiment and an Anishinabek 
warrior, each clad in fatigues and nose-to-
nose in confrontation.  But in 2006, when an 
Onkwehon:we occupation of a building site 
in Caledonia, Ontario created a similar 
flashpoint conflict, the pictures that 
populated newspapers were different. Along 
with a preponderance of stock photos of 
warriors wearing bandanas and perched on 
barricades, we were confronted with 
photographs of local non-Natives furiously 
engaging the Indigenous protesters across 
police lines. The image was of horizontal 
conflict between groups, in other words, 
rather than vertical conflict between 
Indigenous actors and the state. This is an 
expression of the Indigenous-non-
Indigenous relationship to which we should 
become accustomed. 
 But until recently, studies of 
Indigenous politics have left little space for 
the non-elite settler agent. The focus has 
been overwhelmingly on Indigenous people 
as agents, and the settler colonial state as a 
structure.  Therefore, living, acting, mass-
level non-Natives have rarely been 
recognized as the primary subject of 
analysis. There are normative reasons why 
this is undesirable. Focusing solely on 
Indigenous people contributes to the 
construction of the settler as an identity-
neutral "universal subject," against which 
Indigenous peoples are contrasted as cultural 
deviants (Ava Baron, in Veracini 2010: 15). 
There are also empirical questions about the 
Indigenous-settler relationship that demand 
our attention. At present, we know rather 
more about how Indigenous peoples 
experience settler colonialism than about 
how settlers experience Indigenous people 
politically. Recently, efforts have been made 
to address this oversight. "Settler 
colonialism" has emerged as a sub-field of 
theoretically-grounded inquiry, distinct from 
Indigenous political studies. But the 
robustness of this theoretical body for 
explaining actual settler political 
mobilization remains in question.  
This article is motivated by two 
questions: First, what are the normative 
foundations of non-Native political 
mobilization, in the context of conflict with 
Indigenous peoples? Second, can we draw a 
useful analytical distinction between mass 
and elite non-Native actors? In other words, 
in a settler colonial society, is the state the 
single expression of “settlerness,” or do non-
Natives also exist outside the state as a 
meaningful third party?   
These questions will be examined in 
the context of two flashpoint conflict events: 
the occupation of the Ipperwash army base 
and provincial park by Anishinabek 
protesters beginning in the early 1990s; and 
the occupation of a Caledonia building site 
by Onkwehon:we protesters beginning in 
2006.  Both cases saw some degree of 
mobilization by non-Natives in response to 
Indigenous direct action.  These flashpoints 
and the horizontal conflict that accompanies 
them offer an opportunity to view mass-
level settler mobilization around the 
Indigenous issue in an atypically raw and 
honest form. As a result, they can provide 
insight into the normative underpinnings of 
non-Native mobilization, as well as reveal 
the complex relationship between 
Indigenous people, the state, and mass-level 
settler actors. 
 This article will argue that although 
literature has recently sprung up around the 
study of settler colonialism per se, it has yet 
to satisfactorily address these questions. 
Theoretical accounts of settler colonialism 
tend to assume a race-based normative 
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framework predicated on the extinction of 
Indigenous peoples and the creation of new 
societies. There is a primordial streak in this 
presentation of settler colonial identity, 
which fails to capture the dynamic 
reconstruction of national identities that 
occurs in all contexts, including that of 
settler colonialism. Close reading of the 
discourse of non-Native agents suggests 
sincere commitment to an ostensibly 
"colour-blind" liberal national model, and 
that this is more than just a rhetorical ploy 
but actually a powerful normative basis for 
non-Native mobilization in opposition to 
Indigenous claims-making.  The case studies 
also vividly reveal the degree to which 
mass-level settlers operate as autonomous 
actors in conflicts between Indigenous 
groups and the state. Though it takes 
different forms in either case, there is a 
distinct and consistent tripartite political 
dynamic, which produces surprising patterns 
of temporary alliances between Indigenous 
peoples, state actors, and non-Indigenous 
counter-protesters. The "psychocultural 
drama" (Ross 2001) of the occupation 
contributes clarity to settler political norms, 
and to the role of mass non-Natives as 
constraining actors on state elites and 
Indigenous activists.  
 
Theories of “Settlerness” 
 
 Until very recently, it was difficult to 
speak of a focused scholarly literature on 
non-Natives in the context of their 
relationship with Indigenous peoples. We 
caught only brief glimpses of the non-Native 
refracted through Indigenous studies - but 
this has begun to change.  The term "settler 
colonialism" has entered the academic 
lexicon in force, as a normative label for 
abusive practices that victimize Indigenous 
peoples, a hair shirt cheerfully donned by 
self-declared "ally" activists, and 
increasingly, an autonomous area of 
scholarly inquiry. For example, settler 
colonial studies was recently dedicated its 
own specialist journal, and the work of 
authors such as Lorenzo Veracini and 
Patrick Wolfe have begun to generate a 
unified theoretical body to addresses the 
phenomenon.  
 The first task of settler colonial (SC) 
theory has been to distinguish SC from 
colonialism itself. Verancini explains: 
"Colonisers and settler colonisers want 
essentially different things... This analytical 
distinction, and the dissimilarity between the 
relational systems they establish, remains 
crucial especially because distinct stances 
create different conditions of possibility for 
different patterns of relationships" (2011a:1-
2).  Patrick Wolfe, for whom settler colonial 
invasion "is a structure, not an event" (1999: 
96), explains the crucially different 
relationship of regime to colonized people: 
"The primary object of settler-colonization 
is the land itself rather than the surplus value 
to be derived from mixing native labour 
with it... settler colonization is at base a 
winner-take-all project whose dominant 
feature is not exploitation but replacement" 
(Wolfe 1999: 163). Settlers, in this 
presentation, are distinct from colonizers - 
the external agents of domination, who 
operate from distant metropoles in order to 
extract resource wealth - as well as from 
other kinds of migrants, who do not seek to 
"found[]... political orders and carry their 
sovereignty with them" (Veracini 2010: 3). 
This is an obvious disaggregation, but a 
useful starting place for theories of SC. It 
establishes SC as a more clearly bounded 
phenomenon, present in a limited number of 
cases worldwide. 
 The more complex question relates 
to what, beyond the obvious historical 
experience, unifies settler colonialisms, and 
makes them distinct?  A constellation of 
ideas tends to emerge which focuses on the 
"organizing grammar" of race in settler 
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colonies (Wolfe 2006: 387). The ascendancy 
of White over Other has been identified 
historically - for instance by Marilyn Lake 
and Henry Reynolds - as a unifying idea and 
basis for transnational solidarity between 
settler colonies like South Africa, the United 
States, Australia and Canada (2008). Wolfe 
has argued that the various ways that race 
has been institutionalized reflects competing 
goals of SC; the imposition of blood 
quantum regulations on Indigenous people 
provided the means to enact their 
administrative elimination, whereas the "one 
drop" rule for people of African ancestry 
maintained a large slave labour resource 
pool (2006: 387-388). Race, in this 
presentation, is instrumental: a means of 
facilitating the removal of the Native in 
order to seize territory.   
The SC ethic is typically understood 
to be predicated on the elimination of 
Indigenous inhabitants in the interest of 
creating space in which new societies can be 
invented.  Elimination can be achieved 
through several different means: genocidal 
violence, assimilation, the creation of 
administrative restrictions on Indigenous 
belonging, and also incorporation into a 
monist national model.  The insistence of 
settler colonial scholars is that there is no 
discordance in the models adopted by settler 
colonial states, even when they differ 
radically from one to the next, because all 
are anchored in a foundational "logic of 
elimination" (Wolfe 2006). Stated simply, 
"settler colonialism destroys to replace" 
(Wolfe 2006: 388).  
 These are core pillars of SC theory, 
which contribute theoretical language to 
some fairly basic historical, macro-political 
observations. But what do we know about 
settlers themselves? Veracini dedicates a 
chapter of his Settler Colonialism 
monograph to settler "Consciousness," 
highlighting "a number of paranoic 
dispositions characterising the settler 
colonial situation" (2010: p.75). The first 
and most important of these is "disavowal" 
of the Indigenous presence. In the settler 
imagination, the Native is described (rather 
opaquely) as "... either a being that, literally, 
cannot be touched, or a life form whose 
identity and appearance invariably assumes 
the shape that the coloniser is willing to 
project" (ibid, p.84). Settlers are also dogged 
by the experience of "primal scene:" "...the 
moment of inception of the subject's 
memory, which coincides with the moment 
when the illusion of a perfect origin... is 
disturbed for the first time by 
acknowledgement of the other's presence" 
(Temiz 2006). Occasional, inadvertent 
contact with Indigenous people produces 
frustration – and therefore aggression – 
because of the disruption it causes to 
idealized origins myths. Closely connected 
with this is the Freudian notion of "screen 
memory," defined by Veracini as "an 
inaccurate reconstruction (of the past) that 
obscures what really happened" (2010:90).  
This fiction is produced when the subject 
recognizes the significance of a memory, but 
is profoundly reticent to remember it. 
Settlers understand the high stakes 
associated with acknowledging Indigenous 
priority in time or the founding violence of 
their societies, and therefore carefully 
construct a mythological screen. Its 
maintenance necessitates non- or mis-
recognition of Indigenous people.  
 Here are the beginnings of theory-
grounded comparative analysis of settler 
colonial politics. There are however several 
shortcomings, particularly if we are to test 
this model against empirical studies of 
settler political mobilization. In the first 
place, levels of analysis are ambiguous.  The 
bulk of settler colonial theory appears to be 
focused at the level of high politics, and 
there is a broad conflation of settlers with 
the institutions and structures of settler 
colonialism. Even Veracini's treatment of 
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settler "consciousness" provides few tools to 
disaggregate mass and elite-level non-
Natives, as it is framed as a discussion of 
society-wide norms and discourse.  
 The model also presents what might 
be described as a primordial view of 
"settlerness" (Veracini 2011b), or non-
Native identity. Veracini and Cavanagh 
(2013:1) insist that “...There is no such thing 
as neo-settler colonialism or post-settler 
colonialism because settler colonialism is a 
resilient formation that rarely ends."  This 
sense is present in most works on the 
subject, which emphasize historical 
continuity in the many mutations of a single 
political and cultural project. Wolfe's 
argument about the logic of elimination, for 
example, insists that any appearance of 
dynamism in the historical experience of 
settler colonies is superficial (2011). This 
view of settler identity is not primordial in 
precisely the way the term is often 
understood - as an inescapable "organicist" 
form of identity, rooted in biological 
inheritance (Smith 2000). But it does anchor 
national identity in an immutable historical 
fact, and presumes that new expressions are 
variations on a single, constant theme. 
Settler identity in this presentation is 
perennial, ineffable, and a priori in the 
modern world - a product of past structural 
and political change but not vulnerable to 
future change. This is implicit in the 
nomenclature itself; no settlement has 
occurred in southern Canada for many 
generations. But scholars of SC, such as 
Adam Barker, insist on settler as a 
“…descriptive term that recognizes the 
historical and contemporary realities of 
imperialism…” (2009: 329). Settler self-
identification with the continent is ruled 
inadmissible, factually incorrect (Barker 
2009: 329). Settlerness is ascriptive. 
 This is despite the ongoing, dynamic 
reconstruction that characterizes settler 
national identity, as it does all national 
identities. Canada provides ample evidence 
of evolving settler identities, changing 
national myths, and re-interpretation of the 
Indigenous-settler relationship.  Mid-century 
theorists of Canadian settlerness described a 
kind of "paranoaic disposition" that 
resonates strongly with the SC literature. For 
example, Northrop Frye famously identified 
a "garrison mentality" ubiquitous in 
Canadian literature. Garrison mentality was 
characterized by the insularity and 
oppressive collectivism of communities that 
live in fear of "a huge, unthinking, 
menacing, and formidable physical setting" 
(2011: 227). Margaret Atwood recognized 
something similar in her study of Canadian 
identity, a deeply anxious frontier discourse 
where "...the white expedition is small and 
totally surrounded by enemy territory, and 
the Indians win" (1972: 94).  
 But both Atwood and Frye, along 
with other savvy observers of settler 
Canadian identity, acknowledged profound 
change beginning in the 1960s.  The Pearson 
and Trudeau Liberals engaged in a series of 
anti-colonial and indigenizing reforms to the 
national model. At the same time, English 
Canadian identity became dislodged from 
the colonial experience, and rooted instead 
in abstract liberal procedural principles. This 
process culminated in the eventual embrace 
of items such as multiculturalism and the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms as 
keystones of English Canadian identity. The 
settler's imagined relationship with 
Indigenous people also changed profoundly. 
The relationship ceased to be presented as 
zero-sum, as settlers came increasingly to 
see themselves as of the continent, and 
Indigenous people as their symbolic 
ancestors (Atwood 1972: 103).  This 
incorporationist tendency is vividly apparent 
in contemporary discourse.  Adam Gaudry 
(2013) wrote recently of the "Métis-ization" 
of Canadian identity, for example, which has 
seen Louis Riel reclaimed by English 
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Canada as a kind of visionary founding 
father. Gaudry highlights John Ralston 
Saul's recent and well-received literary 
effort at arguing (with spotty evidence) that 
Canadian values are actually founded in 
Indigenous knowledge and practice and that, 
as a result, Canada is a "Métis nation" 
(2009). Other examples abound. When the 
federal government invested heavily in 
national myth-making on the occasion of the 
200th anniversary of the War of 1812, for 
instance, it prominently featured Tecumseth 
–implacable Shawnee foe of settler 
expansion - as a Canadian hero.  
 The obvious rejoinder from SC 
scholars is that this kind of incorporation is 
itself simply a new expression of the logic of 
elimination, a method of erasing the 
Indigenous fact by dissolving it into the 
broader settler politic. This is a defensible 
proposition, but a tautological one. If we 
accept that appearances are misleading and 
that settler colonialism is all things, it 
follows that all things are settler colonial. 
We have learned little new about the nature 
of settler politics. This thought can be 
expressed differently, as a problem of 
conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970; 1991). 
The concept of SC has been made to travel 
immense geographic and temporal distances, 
as well as vertically across levels of 
analysis. It has, of necessity, shed "heuristic 
validity, let alone testability" along the way 
(Sartori 1991: 249).   
This paper suggests that SC studies 
can benefit from the importation of some 
broadly accepted principles in the 
comparative study of identity politics and 
intergroup conflict.  Most important is that 
the researcher should largely allow their 
subjects to self-identify. This manifestly is 
not the case in the study of settler 
colonialism, which is dedicated to parsing 
settler discourse in order to uncover an 
underlying normative framework that would 
be viewed as unfamiliar by many of its 
ostensible practitioners. There is certainly 
debate in the field about how to 
appropriately analyze the normative bases 
for participation in intergroup conflict.  
Hayward and Dochartaigh (2013) suggested 
recently that "one of the risks in analyzing 
nationalism is … taking subjects' narratives 
or discourses at face value or, worse, 
treating them as fact" (Hayward and 
Dochartaigh 2013: 7). Russell Hardin and 
other rationalist scholars argue that the 
discourses of conflict participants only 
reflect post-hoc justifications for behaviour 
(Hardin 1995).  But Marc Howard Ross is 
right to argue that "while competing 
narratives serve rhetorical purposes, they are 
much more than political posturing. They 
are also 'obviously true' to group members 
and offer plausible explanations about the 
conflict, its causes, the motives of the 
parties, and what appropriate behaviour 
follows from them" (2001:16). Settler 
narratives of conflict reveal important clues 
about the normative foundations of 
mobilization in opposition to Indigenous 
people. Taking discourse seriously allows us 
to push past our current reliance on 
satisfying but lazy strawmen. 
 
Indigenous Direct Action and Settler 
Counter-Mobilization 
 
 This paper adopts two case studies of 
flashpoint conflicts originating in 
Indigenous direct action in order to study the 
foundations of settler mobilization. These 
conflicts provide a rare opportunity to view 
a more visceral, mass-level expression of 
non-Native mobilization around the 
Indigenous issue.  They also provide a 
better-than-usual opportunity to study 
identity discourse. As Kissane and Sitter 
(2013) suggest, "during [conflict] a 
simplification of the national past occurs, 
one that obliterates nuance in favor of a 
dichotomous reading of national values... 
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when crises expose the vulnerability of the 
legal order, nationalists are forced to 
reconsider the moral basis of the political 
community..." (52-53).  “Flashpoint events” 
(Russell 2010) like the “Oka crisis,” 
Ipperwash and Caledonia  - all originating as 
physical occupations of disputed territory - 
are experienced by both parties not simply 
as interest disputes, but as what Marc 
Howard Ross  (2001) calls "psychocultural 
dramas:"  
 
…conflicts between groups over 
competing, and apparently 
irresolvable, claims that engage the 
central elements of each group's 
historical experience and 
contemporary identity. The manifest 
focus of a psychocultural drama can 
be over the allocation of material 
resources... [but] At a deeper level, 
psychocultural dramas are polarizing 
events about non-negotiable cultural 
claims, perceived threats, and/or 
rights connected to narratives and 
metaphors central to a group's 
identity" (79-80). 
 
As a result, they provoke reasonably honest 
expressions of settler identity in its 
relationship to Indigenous claims-making. 
What is revealed discursively is tremendous 
consistency across cases, not of a nationalist 
or particularist discourse, but rather of a 
defence of ostensibly neutral, "colour-blind" 
procedural principles of liberalism and "law 
and order". Both cases also demonstrate that 
the political agency of settlers is quite 
distinct from the state, and often focused in 
contradictory directions.  
The case studies are based largely on 
32 interviews conducted by the author in 
Caledonia and Ipperwash-area in 2012 and 
2013. Interview participants consisted 
primarily of local non-Natives and 
Indigenous people that participated in or 
were close observers of the mobilizations, 
complemented with a small number of 
provincial and federal officials that were 
involved in negotiations. Participants were 
assured anonymity in recognition of the 
personal and professional repercussions that 
open and honest reflection about non-Native 
mobilization could incur, particularly given 
that mobilization was largely contained 
within local, small and dense social 
networks. Research also comprised local 
newspaper reportage, and some relevant 
documentary materials, including victims’ 
impact statements, websites, and official 
correspondences of non-Indigenous activist 
organizations.  
 
Ipperwash/Aazhoodena Occupation 
 
The southern shores of Lake Huron, 
in southwestern Ontario, were occupied by 
Anishinabe beginning in approximately the 
middle of the 17th century.  The Anishinabe 
entered into a treaty federacy with the 
British after the collapse of New France, and 
were critical allies during the American 
Revolution and War of 1812. In the early 
19th century, the Anishinabe experienced 
the degradation of more than 99% of their 
traditional southern Lake Huron land base 
(Holmes 2004: 18).  Four reserves were 
created out of a surrender treaty of 1827, 
including reserves at Kettle Point and 
Stoney Point, or Aazhoodena, at the Ausable 
River outlet into Lake Huron.   Non-Native 
developers continued to exert pressure on 
the Anishinabe into the early 20th century 
because of the tourism potential of the white 
sand beaches. Several shoreline tracts were 
surrendered in 1927 amidst allegations of 
corruption. One of these tracts was later 
converted into Ipperwash Provincial Park. 
During the Second World War, all of the 
Stoney Point reserve was appropriated by 
the Department of National Defence, and 
converted into an army camp. The residents 
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of Stoney Point were forcibly relocated to 
Kettle Point, where they remained for the 
next fifty years.   
 Beginning in the late 1980s, former 
residents of Stoney Point and their 
descendants began to demand the return of 
the land through direct action. Contention 
escalated from demonstrations to short-term 
occupations to the establishment, in 1993, of 
a permanent physical occupation of the army 
camp. In 1995, the occupation was expanded 
to incorporate the neighbouring provincial 
park. This produced violent conflict with the 
police, and the shooting death of an unarmed 
Anishinabek protester, Dudley George.  
 
Settler Counter-Mobilization 
 The non-Indigenous community 
immediately adjacent to the army camp and 
provincial park is a mixed neighbourhood of 
cottages and year-round residences.  The 
closest major town is Forest, Ontario, with a 
population of approximately 3000. There are 
a handful of other towns in the area, 
including Bosanquet, Grand Bend, Thedford 
and Arkona, which were amalgamated in 
2001 into the municipality of Lambton 
Shores.  The local non-Native response to 
the Aazhoodena occupation occurred on 
only a small scale prior to the conflagration 
with the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), 
consisting primarily of low-grade lobbying 
of local politicians and police officials, and 
complaints about ostensible spill-over 
lawlessness from the occupation.  Following 
the shooting, however, the OPP conceded de 
facto control of the park and immediate 
environs to the Anishinabe, pulling back 
into a containment posture.  In this context, 
local settlers began to formally organize, 
professing fear of their perceived vulnerable 
position.  
 In the aftermath of the violent 
confrontation, cottagers and permanent 
residents began holding meetings under the 
auspices of a new organization called ON-
FIRE: the Ontario Federation for Individual 
Rights and Equality. By 1996, the 
membership of ON-FIRE apparently totaled 
over 1300 members, including a high 
proportion of the small local non-Native 
population.  The organization had also 
developed a constitution, by-laws, and 
membership application processes (Schultz 
1996a). ON-FIRE took a hard line on 
enforcement. Its members publicly decried 
the peacekeeping approach of the OPP, even 
lobbying for the RCMP to be deployed in its 
place on the assumption that it would act 
more aggressively (Forest Standard 1996). 
The slow pace of negotiations meant that the 
land issue itself was not a non-Native 
preoccupation, but residents organized in 
opposition to other kinds of accommodation 
of the occupiers. For example, when the 
municipality planned to re-route a planned 
waterline after occupiers prevented access to 
contractors, the ON-FIRE leadership 
announced it was "shocked and appalled" 
that the council would acquiesce to the 
whims of Stoney Point protesters. Members 
pushed hard for local elites to adopt a more 
contentious posture vis-à-vis the occupation, 
insisting that: "we live this hostage situation 
every day. It is time to stand up" (Hillman-
Rapley 1998). 
 The lobbying efforts of ON-FIRE 
strike several distinct discursive notes that 
are replicated closely in the Caledonia case. 
The group advanced a rights-based 
discourse, and rooted their opposition in 
procedural principles such as rule of law, 
public order, and equality. Surprisingly, 
there was also a consistent tendency to 
bracket Indigenous grievances out of the 
critique - even to acknowledge the veracity 
of Indigenous grievances - but to argue that 
they fail to offer sufficient justification for 
the violation of liberal equalitarian 
principles. Historical mistreatment of the 
Anishinabe and the responsibility for 
restitution were both externalized, and 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 8, No. 1, 2014, 43-62 
 
51 
 
framed as falling within the exclusive 
purview of the state. 
 Examples abound in letters written 
by ON-FIRE members to local and national 
political elites. One example is quoted at 
length below. The author draws a principled 
distinction between legitimate means for 
pursuing grievances – those that occur 
within institutions - and illegitimate means, 
without evaluating the Anishinabek claim in 
question. They also express the expectation 
that as "ordinary citizens," the local settler 
population should not be affected by conflict 
between Indigenous people and the 
Canadian state - the stuff of high politics. 
Finally, state agents are accused of pursuing 
some murky interest at the expense of non-
Native citizens: 
 
...Law and order are fundamental to 
ensure that individual rights are 
balanced with the needs of the 
community... In September 1995, 
some members of the community 
took it upon themselves to determine 
what was rightfully theirs without 
the benefit of the official judicial 
body. These members acting as they 
did, [sic] are by any definition 
lawbreakers. Whether the law is 
correct or not, lawbreaking is simply 
that... Law-abiding citizens expect 
the government to maintain a safe 
and healthy environment for its 
citizens. They know also that they 
are supposed to invoke the system 
set up by government when there is a 
dispute that is beyond their realm. 
The land claim dispute is not within 
the realm of ordinary citizens to 
resolve. Clearly, it is a government 
responsibility. The lack of 
government leadership in this dispute 
leads to the conclusion that the 
government has another 
agenda...(Author unknown 1996a). 
Correspondences carefully avoid ethno-
specific references. In the above example, 
the Anishinabek occupiers are described 
only as "members of the community," and 
later "lawbreakers." In other letters, they are 
referred to as a "special interest group" 
(Author unknown 1996b). ON-FIRE leaders 
also took great pains to counter any charge 
of racism; correspondences emphasized that 
"membership and representation in this 
Association has also been offered to all First 
Nations" (Schultz 1996b). They also 
commonly draw distinctions between 
legitimate Aboriginal claimants on the one 
hand - the Stoney Pointers, who had been 
victim of profound and unambiguous land 
theft - and non-local Natives on the other 
hand, who are accused of causing the real 
problems despite not having personal stakes 
in the return of the land. Many ON-FIRE 
letter writers acknowledged a history of 
mistreatment of Indigenous peoples and the 
need for restitution, but insisted that settler 
citizens should be unaffected by such a 
process. For example: “…we agree with the 
return of Ipperwash Army Camp to the 
natives. I have no problem with this, but 
when property surrounding the area is held 
in limbo, as a land owner I disagree” 
(Author unknown 1996d).  Above all else, 
they protested an apparent state of "two sets 
of laws in Canada," a violation of the 
principle of equality (Author unknown 
1996c). A member summarized the position: 
"There is a wider spread awareness of the 
need for equality in our country. [ON FIRE] 
has just begun to build support for fairness 
to all. ONE country - ONE law for all... we 
are not racist people, however, Gov't native 
policies tend to be racist - treating natives 
better than taxpayers" (Author unknown 
1996c.).  
 
Indigenous-Settler-State Relations 
In general, settlers at Ipperwash 
played a less central role in the flashpoint 
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event, and adopted less contentious means 
of collective action than their counterparts 
will be shown to have done at Caledonia. 
Partly, this reflects the nature of each 
conflict. As will be discussed below, the 
geography of the Caledonia occupation and 
blockades invited the direct participation of 
non-Natives. But the more peripheral role of 
mass-level settlers at Ipperwash also reflects 
a programmatic commitment on the part of 
the provincial government of the day to 
reflect the inputs of non-Natives in the 
context of negotiations and Aboriginal 
policy-making.  
 Mike Harris's Progressive 
Conservatives signaled during the 1995 
election that the interests of non-Natives 
would play a larger role in land negotiations 
with Indigenous peoples. The party 
produced a consultation document in early 
1995 that cited the fact that: "Non-natives 
voiced concern and consternation that land 
claim negotiations are conducted behind 
closed doors... Queen's Park [is] alienating 
non-natives. People believe that two systems 
of conservation law are being created: one 
for natives, and another for non-natives" 
(Linden 2007: 115). In response, the party 
promised to "balance the interests of native 
and non-native Ontarians by ensuring that 
all stakeholders are represented in native 
land claims negotiations. Native rights must 
be respected, but land claims negotiations 
cannot be the exclusive preserve of 
provincial bureaucrats and native band 
leaders" (Linden 2007: 115.). Before the 
conflict at Ipperwash became a 
preoccupation, the Ontario government had 
already promised to champion non-native 
interests in Aboriginal relations venues. 
This promise was delivered in the 
context of the conflict. After the shooting, 
government officials held meetings with 
local non-Natives while insisting that no 
meetings would take place with Indigenous 
leadership until the occupation ended. The 
local MPP, a PC member, later described his 
close contact with the non-Native residents 
of Ipperwash: "I had clients that lived there 
and I had acquaintances, friends, that lived 
there also" (Beaubien 2006: 280). This 
pattern was replicated in negotiations across 
the province. A senior provincial land 
claims negotiator recalls that in receiving his 
mandate from the new PC political masters: 
"there was a much heavier emphasis on, 
what do third parties think? Third parties 
like stakeholders, non-aboriginal people" 
(interview 23 November 2012).  This 
ideological and policy commitment on the 
part of the provincial government to 
prioritize local non-Indigenous interests in 
negotiations had the effect of reducing 
settler mobilization.  Non-natives had ample 
opportunity to process grievances about 
conflict through normal channels, and 
generally did so. 
 But while mass-level settlers and the 
state were generally closely aligned during 
the conflict, they remained independent 
from each other. This was more obviously 
the case after the conflict had subsided 
when, beginning in 2004, the new Liberal 
provincial government commissioned an 
inquiry into the shooting death of Dudley 
George.  The participation of local non-
Natives in the inquiry reflected anger at the 
new public narrative that was developing 
around the conflict. At a community 
meeting, for example, ON-FIRE leader 
Mary LaPratt accused the Commission of 
undue sympathy to the Anishinabek cause 
while minimizing the hardship experienced 
by settlers: "You didn't live here, you 
weren't here" (Hillman-Rapley 2006).  Local 
municipal politician Gord Minielly angrily 
refuted outsider elite portrayals of the facts: 
"The media has continually been told there 
were no guns [at the occupation site] and I 
want it on the record there were” (Hillman-
Rapley 2006).  Another local resident 
suggested the government response to 
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Ipperwash was driven by "blithering idiots 
on both sides" (Hillman-Rapley 2006). ON-
FIRE and organizers involved in the 
Caledonia counter-mobilization collaborated 
on a website titled The Ipperwash Papers, 
which purports to detail the deliberate 
exclusion of non-Indigenous voices from the 
inquiry, leading to a biased result: “the 
failures of the Ipperwash Inquiry [mean] that 
more innocent people… [are] destined to be 
sacrificed on the altar of political-
correctness” (quoted in Hedican 2013: 182). 
If the participation of mass-level non-
Natives in the conflict itself was muted, this 
was only a reflection of temporarily 
convergent state and non-Native interests. 
 
Caledonia/Kanonhstaton Occupation 
 
The Onkwehon:we, or Six Nations of 
the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, 
traditionally occupied a large territory in the 
area of present-day New York State. After 
the Revolutionary War, a large number of 
Onkwehon:we were forced out of the 
American, to re-settle in their traditional 
beaver hunting grounds at the Haldimand 
Tract, a 950 000 acre territory running along 
the Grand River. But the Tract was rapidly 
degraded after settlement, and an 1841 block 
surrender of questionable veracity left the 
Six Nations on a reserve constituting less 
than 5% of the original Haldimand Tract.  
The Confederacy experimented with 
a range of methods for contesting the loss of 
land, including international advocacy and 
some early instances of direct action. In the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, several direct 
acts of escalating severity occurred. In 
February 2006, activists established an 
occupation of the Douglas Creek Estates 
building site on the outskirts of the town of 
Caledonia. The site was re-named 
Kanonhstaton, “the protected place.” The 
OPP performed a failed raid on the site in 
April, sparking massive mobilization from 
the community. Subsequently, the OPP 
declined from enforcing injunctions to 
remove the protesters, and was popularly 
perceived as adopting a more conciliatory 
and conservative policing approach that 
reflected the lessons of Ipperwash. 
Throughout the summer, clashes took place 
between the Six Nations protesters and non-
Natives from Caledonia and elsewhere. 
Tensions were reduced over time, but the 
occupation remains in place to date.  
 
Non-Native Counter-Mobilization 
 The unusually large degree of mass-
level non-Native involvement in this 
particular mobilization is best explained by 
the political geography of the occupation. 
Caledonia has been described as "the first 
significant protest situation that involved an 
urban population" (interview, 25 February 
2013). The targeted site was immediately 
adjacent to established residential 
neighbourhoods of Caledonia, as well as a 
school, church, and retail area. It was also 
removed from the contiguous reserve, 
meaning that there were non-Native homes 
between the site and the reserve and thus, 
behind the barricades. The Kanonhstaton 
occupation was less geographically 
peripheral than Oka and Ipperwash, and the 
concomitant blockades had a more 
immediate impact on non-Native lives. As a 
result, settlers became highly mobilized, and 
adopted repertoires of action that met and 
exceeded the degree of contentious action 
deployed by Onkwehon:we.  
 The first major party in the non-
Indigenous counter mobilization consisted 
primarily of residents of Caledonia, 
including prominent civic leaders.  Behind 
the leadership of local businessman and 
future mayor Ken Hewitt, an ad hoc "unity" 
rally was organized shortly after the 
barricades were erected. The rally brought 
more than 3000 local non-Natives into the 
streets, and sparked the first confrontation 
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between Onkwehon:we and non-Natives 
across police lines (Keefer 2010: 79). These 
confrontations became routine, particularly 
on weekend nights throughout the spring 
and early summer (interviews 15 February 
2013; 25 February 2013; Keefer 2010: 79). 
Hewitt and supporters coalesced into the 
Caledonia Citizens Alliance.  
 Though it was responsible for much 
of the initial mobilization, the Citizens 
Alliance did not represent the most hardline 
element within settler society, and was 
eventually out-bid by more confrontational 
parties.  There was actually a significant 
degree of internal political diversity within 
the Alliance, and members split over the use 
of incendiary language (interviews, 27 
February 2013; 25 February 2013). A more 
serious threat to both Indigenous peoples 
and state authorities intent on maintaining a 
relative peace came from outside the 
immediate community, and beyond the 
control of the Citizens' Alliance.  According 
to a member of the Alliance:  
 
Any time you got close to a 
weekend, suddenly it became a 
grandstand affair, where everybody 
within 12 hours who wanted to make 
it a spectacle came in to 
grandstand…it became a rodeo.... the 
[Citizens Alliance] had more 
influence on our own people in town. 
But there were weekends where you 
were on the speaker horn 
encouraging people to back off, and 
they'd tell you to "F" off. A huge 
volume of people, and none of them 
were locals. (interview, 25 February 
2013). 
 
Most notable amongst the "outsider" protest 
leaders was Gary McHale, a computer 
scientist and conservative political activist 
from Richmond Hill. He launched a website 
in the early summer of 2006 that became a 
hub for organizing counter-protests aimed at 
both the Onkwehon:we and state agents like 
the OPP and politicians. When the website 
first garnered attention, McHale 
acknowledged that he had no connection to 
the Citizens Alliance or "anyone else in 
Caledonia, really," but was provoked to 
mobilize out of principled rejection of the 
"two-tier approach" to law enforcement 
employed in Caledonia (Burman 2006). As 
the occupation wore on and local non-
Natives began to demobilize, particularly 
after all the barricades had come down, 
McHale became the primary engine behind 
conflict in and around the site. In October of 
2006, he organized a "March for Freedom" 
at the site, which drew a chorus of criticism 
from political elites.  McHale organized an 
ongoing series of demonstrations in 2006 
and 2007, earning notoriety for a particular 
protest performance meant to highlight the 
differential treatment of Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous people by police. On several 
occasions, McHale and his followers - later 
self-styled the "Caledonia 8" - attempted to 
enter the occupied territory and hoist a 
Canadian flag, but were prevented by OPP 
and Onkwehon:we security. In August 2007, 
McHale established an association called the 
Canadian Advocates for Charter Equality 
(CANACE) (Hamilton Spectator 2008). 
 The Citizens' Alliance and 
McHale's cohort differ vastly in degree, but 
there is a deep discursive consistency 
between them, which they share with ON-
FIRE. Both groups directed their lobbying 
efforts toward the restoration of "rule of 
law" to the Caledonia area, and the 
reinstatement of equal treatment irrespective 
of ethnocultural origins. References to the 
Canadian liberal national model abounded, 
and much of the anger was outwardly 
directed toward the state, rather than just 
Onkwehon:we people directly. The 
Indigenous grievances at the heart of the 
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conflict were themselves not openly 
questioned, but also rarely addressed.  
 Hewitt, for example, argued that 
"legitimate land claims grievances with the 
federal government" did not justify direct 
action that disrupted lives and devalued 
homes: "since when did freedom of speech 
and freedom to protest give anyone the right 
to disrupt the lives of others, through fear, 
intimidation, the burning of tires, destroying 
public property...?" (Smith 2006). McHale 
drew the same distinction between political 
grievances and extra-legal action, insisting 
"I've made it perfectly clear that since I've 
been involved that I don't address land 
claims issues. If the government owes them 
the land, give it to them. If the government 
owes them money give them the money. My 
issue is that you cannot use criminal 
offences to further your political agenda" 
(Windle 2006a). He repeatedly refuted the 
perception that he was a racist, commonly 
invoking the Canadian liberal national 
model, and effectively presenting himself as 
an anti-racist activist: 
 
The fact is we have a system now in 
Caledonia and Ipperwash where the 
laws of the land are dictated by your 
race... Obviously anyone takes a 
stand against a group in Canada, 
people throw out the racist card. I 
make no racist statements against 
them. The concept of equality, 
multiculturalism, the concept of 
freedom are not exclusive to any one 
group (Nelson 2006).  
 
McHale even regularly (and gallingly) cited 
Martin Luther King as a hero and model in 
his advocacy. CANACE described its 
mission as "opposing lawlessness and 
racially-based policing during aboriginal 
land claims with the goal of preventing 
violence and civil rights abuses of both 
native and non-native citizens", and 
"...holding police, politicians and native 
extremists accountable for committing 
crimes...", all of which constituting "one of 
the most important human rights struggle 
(sic.) in our country's history" (Canadian 
Advocates for Charter Equality n.d. (a)).  
Great pains are taken to avoid an ethno-
specific discourse; McHale commonly 
insisted that "race based policing" and 
extremism also "victimized innocent native 
people as well" (Canadian Advocates for 
Charter Equality n.d. (b)).  
 
Indigenous-Settler-State Relations 
 Caledonia/Kanonhstaton offers 
some fascinating examples of the 
triangularity of Indigenous-non-Indigenous-
State relations. At certain moments, state 
and Indigenous actors were more closely 
aligned than is anticipated in the dyadic, 
normative imagination of SC theory. During 
the most heated exchanges between non-
Indigenous protesters and the occupiers, 
occupation site security worked in close 
concert with the OPP (interview, 9 February 
2013). OPP passed warnings to the 
occupiers when (for example) they saw non-
Natives massing in the Canadian Tire 
parking lot or stockpiling beer, or when they 
received intelligence of a planned march 
(Muse 2006a; Windle 2006b).  When non-
Natives were able to enter the site, they were 
often restrained by site security and 
promptly turned over to the OPP (Windle 
2006c). After the failed raid, the OPP also 
openly focused its policing on non-Natives, 
rather than Onkwehon:we. During one major 
confrontation, a police officer told an 
Indigenous reporter: "...we aren't too 
worried about the Native side doing 
anything. The fact we only have five police 
facing that way kind of proves that, right?" 
(Windle 2006d). The structure of the police 
deployment was cited by hardline opponents 
of the occupation as evidence of OPP-
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 8, No. 1, 2014, 43-62 
 
56 
 
Onkwehon:we mutual complicity 
(Blatchford 2011).  
 Beyond ground-level policing, there 
was cautious cooperation between 
Indigenous and state leaders in managing the 
conflict (if not in settling claims), and this 
cooperation often earned the ire of mass-
level and local elite settlers.  Provincial and 
federal officials took pains to persuade non-
Natives of the legitimacy of the negotiations 
they had entered into. David Peterson, the 
former premier and first province-appointed 
negotiator at Caledonia, was routinely 
heckled in public presentations to the people 
of Caledonia, facing the accusation that: 
"Anything the Indians want, you'll give 
them" (Muse 200b). While provincial and 
federal actors established negotiating tables 
with the Haudenosaunee, for example, the 
local municipal council passed a resolution 
condemning any negotiations that occurred 
before the barricades were removed (Muse 
2006c).  
 The surprising degree of 
cooperation between Indigenous and state 
actors, to the exclusion of local non-Native 
actors, is reflected in two brief anecdotes. 
First, when OPP commissioner Gwen 
Boniface resigned her post in August 2006, 
leading Onkwehon:we protesters paid her 
tribute, citing her "patience" and "peaceful 
resolve" (Puxley 2006). They were echoed 
by other Indigenous leaders. This was in 
stark contrast to mass-level and local elite 
non-Natives, who had been fiercely critical 
of her for perceived acquiescence to 
Indigenous militancy. Both the Mayor of 
Haldimand County and Caledonia Citizens' 
Alliance leader Ken Hewit publicly 
celebrated her departure, condemning her 
for failing her responsibilities to the people 
of Caledonia (ibid.). In a similar vein, in 
2009 the new OPP commissioner, Julian 
Fantino, shocked non-Native observers by 
defending an occupation-member in court.  
Clyde “Bullet” Powless, leader of site 
security at Kanonhstaton from the early 
stages of the occupation, was charged with 
assault after an altercation with Gary 
McHale. Powless pleaded guilty, but 
Fantino wrote a letter presented in court in 
his defence. The OPP commissioner praised 
Powless for "diffusing serious conflict and 
confrontation," and went on to accuse 
McHale of "mischief-making forays into 
Caledonia" (Brown 2009).     
 Certainly, immense ill-will existed 
between the Onkwehon:we and OPP, 
particularly after the OPP raid which was 
perceived as breaking several explicit 
promises that had been made to Six Nations. 
But despite this, there was some meaningful 
cooperation between Indigenous and state 
actors at various points in the occupation.  
From a theoretical standpoint, it is more 
important that often these two parties 
aligned in opposition to the expressed 
interests of mass-level settlers. 
 
Discussion 
 
What does settler mobilization in 
conflict reveal about the foundations of SC? 
The above cases suggest two conclusions: 
first, that Canadian settler political 
mobilization is framed in terms of norms of 
procedural liberalism; and second, that 
mass-level settlers are not agents of the 
settler colonial state, but are actually 
autonomous actors capable of operating in 
opposition both to Indigenous peoples and to 
the state itself. Both findings can be read as 
disruptive to the SC theoretical body in its 
present iteration. 
The settler consciousness described 
to us in the theoretical literature is not 
recognizable in the discourse of actual 
settlers - even those specifically mobilized 
in opposition to Indigenous assertiveness. It 
is difficult to accommodate Veracini's 
notions of "primal scene" or "screen 
memory" to the cases described above. This 
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is particularly true because of the most 
surprising tendency expressed by groups as 
radically anti-Indigenous as CANACE and 
ON-FIRE: their readiness to acknowledge 
the fact of historical injustice towards 
Indigenous people. The dubious sincerity of 
their concern over these injustices is 
immaterial.  What is important in this 
analysis is how settlers make sense of the 
conflict. The historical narrative implicit in 
their presentation does not imagine 
Indigenous people out of existence. It does 
not even preclude the possibility that some 
form of redress is necessary in the present 
tense. Instead, it rallies around procedural 
norms about the legitimacy of direct action, 
and the importance of (ostensible) equality 
before the law.  It imagines a clear 
distinction between the settler body politic 
and the state. The latter is that which is 
guilty of mistreating Indigenous people, and 
therefore rendering mass-level settlers 
vulnerable to Indigenous reprisals.  The 
imagined in-group-out-group entanglement 
is rather more complex than Indigenous-
Settler, or "civilization-savage" as is often 
suggested.  "Us" makes some space for well-
behaved Indigenous people, especially local 
Indigenous people that have experienced 
injustice but remained committed to 
institutionalized methods of pursuing 
redress.  "Them" includes Indigenous 
protesters, but also cowardly non-Native 
elites that are unwilling to defend sacred 
principles like the rule of law.  These 
normative foundations are explicit in the 
organizational appellations themselves - the 
Ontario Federation for Individual Rights and 
Equality, Canadian Advocates for Charter 
Equality - which echo each other to a 
remarkable degree. They serve rhetorical 
purposes, indisputably, but also reflect the 
ideational basis of the non-Native critique.  
To be clear, this is an empirical 
rather than normative argument. It is not to 
suggest, for example, that settler counter-
mobilization does not include substantial 
racist content. Racism was perfectly explicit 
at both flashpoint conflicts - for example, in 
the presence of organized white supremacist 
groups like the Northern Alliance, who 
commonly visited Caledonia on weekends 
(interview, 9 February 2013; Keefer 2010: 
81); in young Caledonians waving placards 
that read "Don't Feed the Animals;" and in 
avowedly racist hate mail sent to a young 
member of the Ipperwash occupation. It was 
also, of course, present in far subtler forms. 
All interview subjects – including direct 
participants in non-Native counter-
mobilization – identified casual and explicit 
racist sentiment amongst some members of 
established non-Native groups. It is present 
though unconscious in quotes presented 
above – for example, by the letter writer 
who deplores racism while in the next line 
distinguishing between “taxpayers” and 
“natives” (Author unkown 1996c). But 
whether and where racism is present as a 
social-psychological impulse is a separate 
question, and sometimes a difficult one to 
answer with the political scientist’s level of 
remove from individual subjects. Regardless 
of the answer, it remains the case that there 
is empirical relevance in how participants 
discuss the conflict and their participation in 
it.  Mass-level discourse, in particular, is less 
likely to be the function of strategic framing, 
and more likely to reflect the cognitive 
schema that produce what Ross calls 
"obviously true" facts, "plausible 
explanations about the conflict" (2001: 16). 
Rather than emphasizing race or disavowal, 
mobilized non-Natives framed their critique 
around anti-racist precepts, arguing that 
Indigenous exceptionalism was itself a form 
of racism.   
The autonomous nature of mass-
level settlers was clear both in discourse and 
in observation of the dynamics of the 
flashpoint event. This too is theoretically 
important in the study of SC. Veracini 
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(2011) describes "triangular relations" as an 
intrinsic condition of SC, but he refers to 
something quite different: the settler 
colonizer is presented as an integral whole, 
confronted with the dual agencies of 
Indigenous and subaltern Others.  But the 
three agencies in the cases examined above 
belong to state elites, Indigenous people, and 
mass-level settlers. The point is not simply 
that mass-level non-Natives are something 
beyond agents of a unitary settler project. In 
some cases, Indigenous and state agencies 
may be more closely aligned - albeit 
temporarily - than state and mass-level 
settler agencies. This was the case at 
Caledonia, for example, when both 
Onkwehon:we and political elites desired to 
maintain the relative peace, and so 
cooperated to mitigate the threat of angry 
settler counter-mobilizers. In other contexts, 
Indigenous and settler mass actors may have 
convergent interests to the exclusion of the 
state - for example, in the timely resolution 
of land claims disputes. When Caledonians 
held their first angry rally, occupation leader 
Clyde Powless told a Six Nations 
newspaper: "I think it's good. They are 
angry about this too... We all want the same 
thing here" (Windle 2006e).  This 
recognition generates a greatly more 
complex image of Indigenous-settler 
relations, and one that can inform studies of 
land claims negotiations, Aboriginal Affairs 
policy-making, as well as more abstract and 
theoretical work. It reminds us that both 
settler and Indigenous elites operate inside 
of “nested games” (Tsebelis 1990) – that 
their orientation towards each other partly 
reflects social pressures from their 
respective communities, including 
intragroup political challengers. Non-elite 
settlers theoretically possess the agency to 
derail efforts at reconciliation or restitution 
at the political level even when it is actively 
pursued by elites.  
 
There is vast room for future 
productive research on non-Indigenous 
political responses to Indigenous people, 
with several important questions for which 
there are yet no answers. For example, what 
motivates non-state settlers to mobilize in 
opposition to Indigenous peoples, within or 
outside of institutions?  I have sketched out 
the normative framework through which 
settlers make sense of their involvement, but 
have not here weighed norms against other 
kinds of explanatory factors, such as 
material interests, to determine what 
represents the foremost impetus for 
mobilization. Organizing against a blockade 
or occupation, which can impose daily 
inconvenience or even decreases property 
values, suggests a prima facie instrumental 
motivation. But it is notable in the case of 
Caledonia that outsiders like Gary McHale – 
people unaffected by the material costs of 
the occupation – led the most contentious 
mobilization. McHale and company made 
their cause portable, seeking to mobilize 
non-Natives in other communities that 
experienced Indigenous direct action. When 
leading non-state settlers become this far 
removed from the immediate impact of 
Indigenous direct action, the explanatory 
power of norms begins to look stronger. But 
on this question, more research is required. 
It should also be noted that non-
native involvement in Indigenous politics is 
far from univocal. There is a small but 
growing research literature on “allies” and 
allyship – non-Native mobilization in 
defence of Indigenous claims to sovereignty, 
jurisdiction and resources (see for example, 
Davis 2010). Much of this is dedicated to 
normative questions about appropriate forms 
of participation, but attention has also been 
paid to instrumental and substantive 
partnerships between, for example, 
environmentalists and Indigenous groups. 
The allyship phenomenon has obvious 
bearing on questions of non-elite settler 
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agency, and the normative underpinnings of 
settler identity. Future research should 
continue to explore the origins of, 
motivations for, and expressions of allyship 
in practice.  
To further complicate matters, the 
distinction between state actors and non-
elites threatens to obscure important 
differences between actors at various levels 
of government. Federal, provincial, and 
municipal governments often have divergent 
interests with respect to Indigenous direct 
action, and though space did not allow for 
this political dimension to be developed 
here, it was vividly apparent in both cases. 
Of particular note was the orientation of 
municipal governments at Caledonia and 
Ipperwash; in both cases, the municipalities 
were distinctly less conciliatory than their 
federal and provincial counterparts, siding 
(perhaps unsurprisingly) with the mobilized 
local non-Natives. Recently, more research 
attention has been paid to municipality-First 
Nations relations (see for example Alcantara 
and Nelles 2011), and this line of inquiry 
can also contribute to the study of settler 
colonialism. 
In short, SC studies should make 
space for the dynamic and heterogenous 
nature of the phenomenon under 
examination. "Settlerness" is a moving 
target, and to fit each new iteration 
awkwardly into a set of limited theoretical 
constants is to deprive it of heuristic value.  
The cases studied here suggest that 
contemporary Canadian settler identity is 
grounded in a liberal national model, and as 
such, does not require the disavowal of the 
Indigenous fact - or even the fact of 
historical injustice - in order to mobilize 
non-Natives into horizontal conflict with 
Indigenous people. Moreover, when SC is 
presented as a conflation of state and people, 
important insight into the politics of 
Indigenous-settler relations is obscured. In 
the case of Canada, the contemporary reality 
is that mass-level settlers regard the direct 
institutions and practices of SC - the Indian 
Act, for example, which maintains the 
separateness of First Nations from the 
broader body politic - as violations of their 
liberal egalitarian national model. Their 
interventions are often equally antagonistic 
towards Indigenous and state agents.  As 
such, they can act as constraints at best, and 
veto players at worst in the pursuit of 
restitution.  The result is a constellation of 
intra and intergroup relations that is 
infinitely more complex than the basically 
dyadic imagination of SC theory. There is 
no reason that sharpening our empirical lens 
must entail blunting the moral argument 
around which the study of settler 
colonialism is built. 
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